OF WIT, HUMOR, AND RIDICULE in oratory
OF WIT, HUMOR, AND RIDICULE in oratory. OF WIT, HUMOR, AND RIDICULE in oratory. I have not had time to edit this. It is an archaic mess. You have been warned. THIS article, about eloquence in its largest acceptation, I cannot properly dismiss without making some observations on another type of oratory, in many things similar to the former, but which is naturally suited to light and trivial matters. This, also, may be branched into three sorts, corresponding to those already discussed, directed to the fancy, the passions, and the will ; for that which illuminates the understanding serves as a common foundation to both, and has here nothing peculiar. This may be styled the eloquence of conversation, as the other is more strictly the eloquence of declamation. * - Not, indeed, but that wit, humor, ridicule, which are the essentials of the former, may often be successfully admitted into public harangues. And, on the other hand, sublimity, pathos, vehemence, may sometimes enter the precincts of familiar converse. To justify the use of such distinctive appellations, it is enough that they refer to those particulars which are predominant in each, though not peculiar to either. SECTION I OF WIT. To consider the matter more nearly, it is the Design of wit to excite in the mind an agreeable surprise, and that arising, not from anything marvelous in the subject, but solely from the imagery she employs, or the strange assemblage of related ideas presented to the mind. This end is effected in one or other of these three ways ; first, in debasing things pompous or seemingly grave ; I say seemingly grave, because ego illos credo qui aderant, nee sensisse quid facerent, nec spouts judicioque prausisse; sad velut mente captos, et quo essent in loco ignaros, erupisse in hunc voluntatis affectum, " lib. viii. , cap. 3. Without doubt a considerable share of the effect ought to be ascribed to the immense advantage which the action and pronunciation of the orator would give to his expression. * In the latter of these the ancients excel ; in the former, the moderns. Demosthenes and Cicero, not to say Homer and Virgil, to this day remain unrivalled; and in all antiquity, Lucian himself not excepted, we eltinot find a match for Swift and Cervantes. to vilify what is truly grave, has something shocking in it, which rarely fails to counteract the end: secondly, in aggrandizing things little and frivolous : thirdly, in setting ordinary objects, by means not only remote, hut apparently contrary, in, a particular and uncommon point of view. This will be better understood from the following observations and examples. The materials employed by wit in the grotesque pieces she exhibits are partly derived from those common fountains of whatever is directed to the imaginative powers, the ornaments of elocution, and the oratorical figures, simile, apostrophe, antithesis, metaphor ; partly from those she, in a manner, appropriates to herself, irony, hyperbole, allusion, parody, and (if the reader will pardon my descending so low) paronotnasia, f and pun. The limning of wit differs from the ketorical painting above described in two respects. One is, that in the latter there is not only a resemblance requisite in that particular on which the comparison is founded, but there must also be a general similitude in the nature and quality of that which. is the basis of the imagery, to that which is the theme of discourse. In respect of dignity, or The impression they make upon the mind, they must be things homogeneous. What has magnificence must invariably be portrayed by what is magnificent ; objects of importance, by objects important ; such as have grace, by things graceful ; whereas the witty, though requiring an exact likeness in the first particular, demands, in the second, a contrariety rather, * I know no 'language which affords a name for this species of imagery but the English. The French sprit, or kJ esprit, though on some occasions rightly translated wit, lath commonly a tagnificatiou more extensive and generical. It must be owned, indeed, that in conformity to the style of French critics, the term wit, in English writings, hath been sometimes used with equal latitude. But this is certainly a perversion of the word from its ordinary sense, through an excessive deference to the manner and idiom of our ingenious neighbors. Indeed, when an author varies the meaning in the same work, he not only occasions perplexity to his reader, but falls himself into an apparent inconsistency. An error of this kind in Mr. Pope has been lately pointed out by a very ingenious and judicious critic. "In the essay on criticism it is sag, True wit is nature to advantage dress'd:' But immediately after this the poet adds, 'For works may have more wit than does 'em good. ' "Now let us substitute the definition in place of the thing, and it will stand thus : A work may have more of nature "fretted to advantage than will do I. good. This is impossible. ; and it is evident that the confusion arises from the poet's having annexed two different ideas to the same word. "— Brebb's Remarks on the Beauties of Poetry, Dialogue H. . 1. Paronomasia is properly that figure which the French call jeu de mete Suchas " lnceptio est amentium, haud amantium. "—Ter. Astir. "'Which tempted our attempt. "--Mdt. , b. i. "To begird the Almighty's throne, be soeching or besieging. "—B. s. or remoteness. This enchantress exults in reconciling COD tradicuons, and in hitting on that special light and attitude wherein you can discover an unexpected similarity in objects which, at first sight, appear the most dissimilar and heterogeneous. Thus high and low are coupled, humble and superb, momentous and trivial, common and extraordinary. Addison, indeed, observes, * that wit is often produced, not by the resemblance, but by the opposition of ideas. But this, of which, however, he hath not given us an instance, doth not constitute a different species, as the repugnance in that case will always be found between objects in other respects resembling ; for it is to the contrast of dissimilitude and likeness, remoteness and relation in the same objects, that its peculiar effect is imputable. Hence we hear of the flashes and the sallies of wit, phrases which imply suddenness, surprise, and contrariety. These are illustrated, in the first, by a term which implies an instantaneous emergence of light in darkness ; in the second, by a word which denotes an abrupt transition to things distant ; for we may remark, in passing, that, though language be older than criticism, those expressions adopted by the former to elucidate matters of taste, will he found to have a pretty close conformity to the purest discoveries of the latter. Nay, of so much consequence here are surprise and novelty, that nothing is more tasteless, and sometimes disgusting, than a joke that has become stale by frequent repetition. For the same reason, even a pun or happy allusion will appear excellent when thrown out extempore in conversation, which would be deemed execrable in print. In like manner, a witty repartee is infinitely more pleasing than a witty attack ; for, though in both cases the thing may be equally new to the reader or hearer, the effect on him is greatly injured when there is ground to suppose that it may be the slow production of study and premeditation. This, however, holds most with regard to the inferior tribes of witticisms, of which their readiness is the best recommendation. - The other respect in which wit differs from the illustrations of the grayer orator is the way wherein it affects the hearer. Sublimity elevates, beauty charms, wit diverts. The first, as has been already observed, enraptures, and, as it were, dilates the soul; the second diffuseth over it a serene delight ; the third tickles the fancy, and throws the spirits into an agreeable vibration. To these reflections I shall subjoin examples in each of the three sorts of wit above explained. It will, h9wever, be proper to premise that, if the reader shmid not at first be sensible of the justness of the solutions and explications to be given, he ought not hastily to form ax Spectator unfavorable conclusion. Wherever there is taste, the witty and the humorous make themselves perceived, and produce their effect instantaneously ; but they are of so subtle a nature that they will hardly endure to be touched, much less to undergo a strict analysis and scrutiny. They are like those volatile essences which, being too delicate to bear the open air, evaporate almost as soon as they are exposed to it. Accordingly, the wittiest things will sometimes be made to appear insipid, and the most ingenious frigid, by scrutinizing them too narrowly. Besides, the very frame of spirit proper for being diverted with the laughable in objects is so different from that which is necessary for philosophizing on them, that there is a risk that, when we are most disposed to inquire into the cause, we are least capable of feeling the effect ; as it is certain that, when the effect hath its full influence on us, we have little inclination for investigating the cause. For these reasons I have resolved to be brief in my illustrations, having often observed that, in such nice and abstract inquiries, if a proper hint do not suggest the matter to the reader, he will be but more perplexed by long and elaborate discussions. Of the first sort, which consists in the debasement of things great and eminent, Butler, among a thousand other instances, hath given is those which follow : "And now had Phcebus, in the lap Of Thetis, taken out his nap : And, like a lobster boird, the mom From black to red began to tum. " Here the low allegorical "style of the first couplet, and the simile used in the second, afford us a just notion of this lowest species, which is distinguished by the name of the ludicrous. Another specimen from the same author you have in these lines : "Great on the bench, great in the saddle, That could as well bind o'er as swaddle, Mighty he was at both of these, And styled of war as well as peace: So some rats of amphibious nature Are either for the land ormiter. "1* In this coarse kind of drollery those laughable translations or paraphrases of heroic and other serious poems, wherein the authors are said to be travestied, chiefly abound. To the same class those instances must be referred in which, though there is no direct comparison made, qualities of real dignity and importance are degraded by being coupled with things mean and frivolous, as in soma respect standing in the same predicament. An example of this I shall give from the same hand. • Hudibras, part ii. , canto 2. t PAC Part i. , canto 1. • 1. 2. 2. 'For when the restless Greeks sat down So many years before Troy town, 3. 4. And were renown'd, as Homer writes, 5. 6. For well-soaPd boots* no less than fights. "t 7. shall only observe farther, that this sort, whose aim is to debase, delights in the most homely expressions, provincial idioms, and cant phrases. The second kind, consisting in the aggrandizement of little things, which is by far the most splendid, and displays a soaring imagination, these lines of Pope will serve to illustrate : • 'As Berecynthia, while her offspring vie • • In homage to the mother of the sky, • • Surveys around her in the blessed abode • • A hundred sons, and every son a god • • Not with less glory mighty Dulness crowned, • • Shall take through Grub-street her triumphant round ; And her Parnassus glancing o'er at once, • • Behold a hundred sons, and each a dunce. "t • • This whole similitude is spirited. The parent of the celestials is contrasted by the daughter of night and chaos ; heaven by Grub-stYeet ; gods by dunces. Besides, the parody it contains on a beautiful passage in Virgil adds a particular lustre to it. § This species we may term the thrasonical, or the mock- majestic. It affects the most pompous language and sonorous phraseology as much as the other affects the reverse, the vilest and most groveling dialect. • I shall produce another example from the same writer, which is, indeed, inimitably fine. It represents a lady employed at her toilet, attended by her maid, under the allegory of the celebration of some solemn-and religious ceremony. The passage is rather long for a quotation, but as the omission of any part would be a real mutilation, I shall give it entire. • "And now unveird, the toilet stands display'd, Each silver vase in mystic order laid. • • First, robed in white, the nymph intent adores, With head uncovered, the cosmotic powers. • • A heavenly image in the glass appears, • • To that she bends, to that her eyes she rears ; The inferior priestess at her altar's side, Trembling, begins the sacred rites of pride ; Unnumber'd treasures opes at once, and here The various offerings of the world appear ; From each she nicely tulle with curious toil, And decks the goddess with the glittering spoil. • * In allusion to the Evicripasc Axatot, an expression which frequently ecurs both in the Iliad and in the Odyssey. • Hadibras, part i. , canto 2. Dunciad, B. • • The passage is this : • • "Felix prole virum, quails Berecynthia meter Inveniturcurru Phrygias turrita per nbes, Lista defim partu, centum complexa nepotes, Omnes ccelicolas, omnes supers site tenentes. • • This casket India's glowing gems unlocks, And all Arabia breathes from yonder box. The tortoise here and elephant Unite: • • Transformed to combs, the speckled and the white. Her files of pins extend their shining rows, • • Puffs, powders, patches, Bibles, billet dour, . Now awful beauty puts on all its arms, • • The fair each moment rises in her charms, Repairs her smiles, awakens every grace, nd calls forth all the wonders of her face ; Sees by decrees a purer blush arise, • • And keener lightnings quicken in her eyes. "* . • To this . . . Lass also we must refer the applications or grave reflections TO mere trifles ; for that great and serious are naturally associated by the mind, and likewise little and trifling, is sufficiently evinced by the common modes of expression en these subjects used in every tongue. An opposite instance of such an application we have from Philips : • "My galligaskins, that have long withstood The winter's fury and encroaching frosts, By time subdued (what will not time subdue!), An horrid chasm disclose. "t • • Like to this, but not equal, is that of Young: • • "One day his wife (for who COX UNVe. reclaim 0, • • Levell'd her barbarous needle at his fame. "# • • To both the preceding kinds the term burlesque is applied, but especially to the first. • Of the thiril species of wit, which is by far the most multifarious, and which results from what I may call the queerness or singularity of the imagery, I shall give a few specimens that will serve to mark some of its principal varieties. To illustrate all would be impossible. The first I shall exemplify is where there is an apparent contrariety in the thing she exhibits as connected. This kind of contrast we have in these lines of Garth : • "Then Hydrops next appears among the throng Bloated and big she slowly sails along : • • But like a miser in excess she's poor, • • And pines for thirst amid her watery store. "¢ • The wit in these lines doth not so much arise from the comparison they contain of the dropsy to a miser (Which falls under the Description that immediately succeeds), as from the union of contraries they present to the imagination, poverty . in the midst of opulence, and thirst in one who is already drenched in water. A second sort is where the things compared are what with dialecticians should come under the denomination of disparates, being such as can be ranked under no common genus, Of this I shall subjoin an example-from Young : • * Rape of the Lock, canto I. t Splendid Shilling. • • I Universal Passion. PisPensarY • • "Health chiefly keeps an Atheist in the dark ; A fever argues better than a Clarke; • • Let but the logic in his pulse decay. • • Then Grecian he'll renounce, and . earn to pray. "* • • Here, by implication, health is compared to a sophister, or darkener of the understanding, a fever to a metaphysical disputant, a regular pulse to false logic, for the word logic in the third line is used ironically. In other Words, we have here modes and substances, the affections of the body, and the exercise of reason strangely, but not insignificantly, linked together; strangely, else the sentiment, however just, could not be denominated witty ; significantly, because an unmeaning jumble of things incongruous would not be wit, but nonsense. • A third variety in this species springs from confounding artfully the proper and the metaphorical sense of an expression. In this way, one will assign as a motive what is discovered to be perfectly absurd when but ever so little attended to ; and yet, from the ordinary meaning of the words, hath a specions appearance on a single glance. Of this kind you have an instance in the subsequent lines : • "While thus they talk'd, the knight Tum'd th' outside of his eyes to white, As men of inward light are wont • • To turn their optics in upon't. "t • • For whither can they turn their eyes more properly than to the light? • A fourth variety, much resembling the former, is when the argument of comparison (for all argument is a kind of comparison) is founded on the supposal of corporeal or personal attributes in what is strictly not susceptible of them, as in this • "But Hudibras gave him a twitch • • As quick as lightning in the breech. Just in the place where honour's lodged, As wise philosophers have judg'd ; • • Because a kick in that place more • • Hurts honor than deep wounds before. "$ • • Is demonstration itself more satisfactory! Can anything be hurt but where it is I However, the mention of this as the sage deduction of philosophers is no inconsiderable addition to the wit. Indeed, this particular circumstance belongs properly to the first species mentioned, in which high and low, great and little, are coupled. Another example, not unlike the preceding, you have in these words : • • "What makes morality a crime - The most notorious of the time ; Morality, which both the saints And wicked too cry out against ? • • 'Cause grace and virtue are within Prohibited degrees of kin : • • And therefore no true saint allows They shall be suffer'd to espouse. "' • • When the two foregoing instances are compared together, we should say of the first, that it has more of simplicity and nature, and is, therefore, more pleasing ; of the second, that it has more of ingenuity and conceit, and is, consequently, more surprising. • The fifth, and only other variety I shall observe, is that which ariseth from a relation, not in the things signified, but in the sirs of all relations, no doubt the slightest. Identity here gives rise to puns and clinches. Resemblance to quibbles, cranks, and rhymes : of these, I imagine, it is quite unnecessary to exhibit specimens. The wit here is so dependent on the sound, that it is commonly incapable of being transfused into another language, and as, among persons of taste and discernment, it is in less request than the other sorts above enumerated, those who abound in this, and never rise to anything superior, are distinguished by the diminutive appellation of witlings. Let it be remarked in general, that from one or more of the three last-mentioned varieties, those plebeian tribes of Witticism, the conundrums, the rebuses, the riddles, and some others, are lineally, though, perhaps, not all legitimately descended. I shall only add, that I have not produced the forenamed varieties as an exact enumeration of all the subdivisions of which the third species of wit is susceptible. It is capable, I acknowledge, of being almost infinitely diversified ; and it is principally to its various exhibitions that we apply the epithets sportive, sprightly, ingenious, according as they recede more or less from those of the declaimer. • SECTION II. • • OP 11011002. • As wit is the painting, humor is the pathetic, in this inferior sphere of eloquence. The nature and efficacy of humor may be thus unraveled. A just exhibition of any ardent or durable passion, excited by some adequate cause, instantly attacheth sympathy, the common tie of human souls, and thereby communicates the passion to the breast of the hearer. But when the emotion is either not violent or not durable, and the motive not anything real, but imaginary, or, at least, quite disproportionate to the effect ; or when the passion displays itself preposterously, so as rather to obstruct than to promote its aim—in these cases a natural representation, instead of fellow-feeling, creates amusement, and umversally awakens contempt. The portrait, in the former case, we call pathetic ; in the latter, humorous"It was said that the emotion must be either not violent, or not durable. This limitation is necessary, because a passion, extreme in its degree, as well as lasting, cannot yield diversion to h • • posed mind, but generally affects it with pity, not seldom with a mixture of horror and indignation. The sense of the ridiculous, though invariably the same, is, in this case, totally surmounted by a principle of our nature much more powerful. • The passion which humor addresseth as its objects is, as bath been signified above, contempt. But it ought carefully to be noted, that every address, even every pertinent address to contempt, is not humorous. This passion is not less ca- Table of being excited by the severe and tragic than by the merry and comic manner. The subject of humor is always character, , but not everything in character ; its foibles, generally, such as caprices, little extravagances, weak anxieties, jealousies, childish fondness, pertness, vanity, and self-conceit. One finds the greatest scope for exercising this talent in telling familiar stories, or in acting any whimsical part in an assumed character. Such a one, we say, has the talent of humoring a tale, or any queer manner which he chooses to exhibit. Thus, we speak of the passions in tragedy, but of the humors in comedy ; and even to express passion as appearing in the more trivial occurrences of life, we commonly use this term, as when we talk of good-humor, ill-humor, peevish or pleasant humor ; hence it is that a capricious temper we call humorsome, the person possessed of it a hu • 1. It ought to be observed, that this term is also used to express any lively strictures of such specialities in temper and conduct as to have neither moment enough to interest sympathy, nor incongruity enough to excite contempt. In this case, humor not being addressed to passion, but to fancy, must be considered as a kind of moral painting, and differs from wit only in these two things : first, in that character alone is the subject of the former, whereas all things whatever fall within the province of the latter; secondly, humor paints more simply by direct imitation, wit more variously by illustration and imagery. Of this kind of humor, merely graphical, Addison hath given us numberless examples in many of the characters he hath so finely drawn, and little incidents he bath so pleasantly related in his Tattlers and Spectators. I might remark of the wordhumor, as I did of the term wit, that we scarcely find in other languages a word exactly corresponding. The Latin facelice seems to come the nearest. Thus Cicero, Huic generi orationis aspergentur etiam sales, qui in dicendo mirum quantum valent : quorum duo genera aunt, unum facetiarum, altemm dicacitatis ; utetur utroque, sod altero in narrando aliquid venuste alter° in jaciendo mittendoque ridiculo : cujus genera plura sunt. "—Orator, 48. Here one would think that the philosopher must have had in his eye the different provinces of wit and humor, calling the former dicacitas, the latter facetics. It is plain, however, that both by him and other Latin authors, these two words are often confounded. There appears, indeed, to be more uniformity in the use that is made of the second term than in the application of the first. • • morist, and such facts or events as afford subject for the be morous, we denominate comical. • Indeed, comedy is the proper province of humor. Wit is called in solely as an auxiliary ; humor predominates. The comic poet bears the same analogy to the author of the mock- heroic that the tragic poet bears to the author of ate epic. The epos recites, and advancing with a step majestic and sedate, engages all the nobler powers of imagination, a sense of grandeur, of beauty, and of order ; tragedy personates, and thus employing a more rapid and animated diction, seizes directly upon the heart. The little epic, a narrative intended for amusement, and addressed to all the lighter powers of fancy, delights in the excursions of wit : the production of the comic muse, being a representation, is circumscribed by narrower bounds, and is all life and activity throughout. Thus Buckingham says, with the greatest justness, of comedy, • "humor is all. Wit should be only brought To turn agreeably some proper thought. " • The pathetic and the facetious differ not only in subject and effect, as will appear upon the most superficial review of what hall] been said, but also in the manner of imitation. In this the man of humor descends to a minuteness which the orator disdains. The former will often successfully run into downright mimicry, and exhibit peculiarities in voice, gesture, and pronunciation, which in the other would be intolerable. The reason of the difference is this : That we may divert, by exciting scorn and contempt, the individual must be exposed ; that we may move, by interesting the more generous principles of humanity, the language and sentiments, not so much of the individual as of human nature, must be displayed. So very different, or, rather, opposite, are these two in this respect, that there could not be a more effectual expedient for undoing the charm of the most affecting representation, than an attempt in the speaker to mimic the personal singularities of the man for whom he desires to interest us. On the other hand, in the humorous, where the end is diversion, even over-acting, if moderate, is not improper. It was observed already, that though contempt be the only passion addressed by humor, yet this passion may with propriety and success be assailed by the severer eloquence, where there is not the smallest tincture of humor. This it will not be beside our purpose to specify, in order the more effectually to show the difference. Lord Bolingbroke, speaking of the state of these kingdoms from the time of the Restoration, has these words : *. The two brothers, Charles and James, when in exile, became infected with popery to such degrees as their different characters admitted of. Charles • tcad parts, and his good understanding served as an antidote to repel the poison. James, the simplest man of his time, drank off the whole chalice. The poison met, in his composition, with all the fear, all the credulity, and all the obstinacy of temper proper to increase its virulence, and to strengthen its effect. Drunk with superstitious, and even enthusiastic zeal, he ran headlong into his own ruin, while he endeavored to precipitate ours. His Parliament and his people did all they could to save themselves by winning him. But all was vain. He had nd principle on which they could take hold. Even his good qualities worked against them ; and his love of his country went halves with his bigotry. How he succeeded we have heard from our fathers. The Revolution of one thousand six hundred and eighty- eight saved the nation and mined the king. " Nothing can be more contemptuous, and, at the same time, less derisive, than this representation. We should readily say of it that it is strongly animated, and happily expressed ; but no man who =demands English would say it is humorous. I shall add one example from Dr. Swift : "1 should be exceedingly sorry to find the Legislature make any new laws against the practice of dueling, because the methods are easy and many tbr a wise man to avoid a quarrel with honor, or engage in it with innocence. And I can discover no political evil in suffering bullies, sharpers, and rakes to rid the world of each other by a method of their own, where the law hath not been able to find an expedient. 1 • For a specimen of the humorous, take, as a contrast to the last two examples, the following delineation of a fop • "Sir Plume (of amber snuff-box justly vain, And the nice conduct of aclouded cane), With earnest eyes, and round, unthinking face, He first the snuff-box open'd, then the case, • • And thus broke out : ' My lord ! why, what the devil? Z—ds ! damn the lock ! 'fore Gad, you must be civil! Plague on't ! 'tis past a jest ; nay, prithee—pox ! • • Give her the hair. He stroke and rapped his box. It grieves me much, ' replied the peer again. 'Who speaks so well should ever speak in vain But—' "X • • This, both in the descriptive and the dramatic part, particularly in the draught it contains of the baronet's mind, aspect, manner, and eloquence (if we except the sarcastic term justly, the double sense of the word open'd, and the fine irony couched in the reply), is purely facetious. An instance of wit and humor combined, where they reciprocally set off and enliven each other, Pope bath also furnished us with in another part of the same exquisite performance. • • - Whether the nymph shall break Diana's law, • • . Or some frail china jar receives a flaw ; • • Or stain her honor, or her new brocade ; • • Forget her prayers, or miss a masquerade, • • Or lose her heart, or necklace, at a ball ; • • Or whether Heaven has doomed that Shock must fail. " • • This is humorous, in that it is a lively sketch of the female estimate of mischances, as our poet's commentator rightly terms it, marked out by a few striking lineaments. It is likewise witty, for, not to mention the play on words, like that remarked in the former example, a trope familiar to this author, you have here a comparison of a woman's chastity to a piece of porcelain ; her honor to a gaudy robe ; her prayers to a fantastical disguise ; her heart to a trinket ; and all these together to her lapdog, and that founded on one lucky circumstance (a malicious critic would perhaps discern or imagine more), by which these things, how unlike soever in other respects, may be compared, the impression they make on the mind of a fine lady. • Hudibras, so often above quoted, abounds in wit in almost all its varieties, to which the author's various erudition bath not a little contributed. And this, it must be owned, is more suitable to the nature of his poem. At the same time it is by no means destitute of humor, as appears particularly in the different exhibitions of character given by the knight and his squire. But in no part of the story is this talent displayed to greater advantage than in the consultation of the lawyer it to which I shall refer the reader, as the passage is too long for my transcribing. There is, perhaps, no book in any language wherein the humorous is carried to a higher pitch of perfection than in the adventures of the celebrated knight of La Mancha. As to our English dramatists, who does not acknowledge the transcendent excellence of Shakespeare in this province, as well as in the pathetic! Of the latter comic writers, Congreve . has an exuberance of wit, but Farquhar has more humor. It may, however, with too much truth, be affirmed of English comedy in general (for there are some exceptions), that, to the discredit of our stage, as well as of the national delicacy and discernment, obscenity is made too often to supply the place of wit, and- ribaldry the place of humor. Wit and humor, as above explained, commonly concur in a tendency to provoke laughter, by exhibiting a curious and unexpected affinity ; the first, generally by comparison, either direct or implied ; the second, by connecting in some other relation, such as causality or vicinity, objects apparently the most dissimilar and heterogeneous ; which incongruous affinity. we may remark by the way, gives the true meaning . the word oddity, and is the proper object of laughter. . • The difference between these and that grander kind of eloquence treated in the first part of this chapter. I shall, if possible, still farther illustrate by a few similitudes borrowed from the optical science. The latter may be conceived as a plain mirror, which faithfully reflects the object, in color, size, and posture. Wit, on the contrary, Proteus-like, transforms itself into a variety of shapes. It is now a convex speculum, which gives a just representation in form and color, but withal reduces the greatest objects to the most despicable littleness ; now a concave speculum, which swells the smallest trifles to art enormous magnitude ; now, again, a speculum of a cylindrical, a conical, or an irregular make, which, though in color, and even in attitude, it reflects a pretty strong resemblance, widely varies the proportions. humor, when we consider the contrariety of its effects, contempt and laughter (which constitute what in one 'word is termed derision), to that sympathy and love often produced by the pathetic, may, in respect of these, be aptly compared to a concave mirror, when the object is placed beyond the focus ; in which case it appears, by reflection, both diminished and inverted, circumstances which happily adumbrate the contemptible and the ridiculous. • SECTION III. • • Or RIDICULE. • . rHE intention of raising a laugh is either merely to divert by that grateful titillation which it excites, or to influence the opinions and purposes of thellearers. In this, also, the risa ible faculty, when suitably diNcted, bath alien proved a very potent engine. When this fa the view of the speaker, as there is always an air of reasoqing conveyed under that species of imagery, narration, or Description, which stimulates laughter, these, thus blended, obtain the appellation of ridicule, the poignancy of which hath a similar effect, in futile subjects, to that produced by what is called the vehement in solemn and important matters. Nor doth all the difference between these lie in the dignity of the subject. Ridicule is not only eonfined to questions of less moment, but is fitter for refuting error than for supporting truth ; for restraining from wrong conduct, than for inciting to the practice of what is right. Nor are these the sole restrictions ; it is not properly leveled at the false, but at the absurd in tenets ; nor can the edge of ridicule strike with equal force every species of misconduct : it is not the criminal part which it attacks, but that which we denominate silly or foolish. With regard to doctrine, it is evident that • It A not falsity or mistake, but palpable error or absurdity (a thing hardly confutable by mere argument), which is the object of contempt ; and, consequently, those dogmas are beyond the reach of cool reasoning which are within the rightful confines of ridicule. That they are generally conceived to be so, appears from the sense universally assignee to expressions like these, "Such a position is ridiculous. It cloth not deserve a serious answer. " h;verybody knows that they import more than "It is false, " being, in other words, This issuchan extravagance as is not so much a subject of argument as of laughter. " And that we may discover what it is, with regard to -conduct, to which ridicule is applicable, we need only consider the different departments of tragedy and of comedy. In the last it is or mighty influence ; into the first it never legally obtains admittance. Those things which principally come under its lash are awkwardness, rusticity, ignorance, cowardice, levity, foppery, pedantry, and affectation of every kind. But against murder, cruelty, parricide, ingratitude, perfidy, * to attempt to raise a laugh, would show such an unnatural insensibility in the speaker, as would be excessively disgustful to any audience. To punish such enormities, the tragic poet must take a very different route. • Now from this distinction of vices or faults into two classes, there hath sprung a parallel division in all the kinds of poesy which relate to manners. The epopee, a picturesque or graphical poem, is either heroic, or what is called mock-heroic, and by Aristotle iambic, t from the measure in which poems of this kind were at first composed. The drama, an animated poem, is either in the buskin or in the sock ; for farcerdeserves not a place in the subdivision, being at most tint a kind of dramatical apolsgue, whereof the characters are monstrous, thitrigue unebural, the incidents often impossible, and whic-F, instead of humor, has adopted a spurious bantling, called fun. To satisfy us that satire, whose end is persuasion, admits ale the like distribution, we need only recur to the different me ode pursued by the two famous Latin satirists, Juvenal and Horace. The one declaims, the other derides. Accordingly, as Dryden justly observes, : vice is the quarry of the former, folly of the latter. § Thus, , of * To this black catalogue an ancient pagan of Athens or of Rome would have added adultery, but the modem refinements of us Christians (if without profanation we can so apply the name) absolutely forbid it, as nothing in our theatre is a more common subject of laughter than this. Nor is the laugh raised against the adulterer, else we might have some plea for ow morals, if none for our taste ; but, to the indelible reproach of the taste, the sense, and the virtue of the nation, in his favor. How much degenerated from our worthier, though unpolished, ancestors, of whom Tacitus affirms, " Nemo illic vitia ridet ; nee corrumpere et corrurnpi satculum vocatur. "— De Mon Germ. . c. 19. t Poet. 4. 1 Origin and Progress of Satire. 6 The differe ces and relations to be found in the several forms of poetry • the three graver forms, the aim, whether avowed or latent, always is, or ought to be, the improvement of morals ; of the three lighter, the refinement of manners. * But though the latter have for their peculiar object mvsners, in the limited • • and distinctive sense of that word, they may, with propriety, admit many things which directly conduce to the advancement of morals, and ought never to admit anything which hath a contrary tendency. Virtue is of primary importance, both for the happiness of individuals, and for the well-being of society ; an external polish is at best but a secondary accomplishment, ornamental, indeed, when it adds a lustre to virtue, pernicious when it serves only to embellish profligacy, and in itself comparatively of but little consequence, either to private or to public felicsty. t • • mentioned, may be more concisely marked by the following scheme, which brings them under the view at once : • • - • • • Serious. Facetious. • Fancy—Great Epic. • V, —Little Epic. • eq— • insinuation. • Narratoi • Passion—Tragedy. • LComedy. • 8 • • Conforms- • non. • Representer • 4 • Satire. • 1. —Low Satire. j • Persuasion. g • Reasoner • • • These observations will enable us to understand that of the poet : • • " Ridiculum acri • • Fortino et melius magnas plerumque secat res. "—Ho. • • Great and signal, it must be owned rare the effects of ridicule ; but the subject must always appear to the ridiculer, and to those affected by his pleasantry, under the notion of littleness and futility, two essential requisites in the object of contempt and risibility. • t Whether this attention has be always given to morals, particularly in comedy, must be left to the determIstation of those who are most conversant in that species of scenic representations. One may, however, venture to prognosticate that, if in any period it shall become fashionable to show no regard to virtue in such entertainments ; if the hero of the piece, a tine gentleman, to be sure, adorned, as usual with all the superficial and exterior graces which the poet can confer, and crowned with success in the end, shall be an unprincipled libertine, st man of more spirit, forsooth, than to be checked in his pursuits by the restraints of religion, by a regard to the cornmon rights of mankind, or by the laws of hospitality and private friendship, which were accounted sacred among pagans and those whom we denonunate barbarians; then, indeed, the stage will become merely the school of gallantry and intrigue; thither the youth of both sexes will resort, and will not resort in vain, in order to get rid of that troublesome companion, modesty, intended by Providence as a guard to virtue, and a check against licentiousness; there vice will soon learn to provide herself in a proper flock of -effrontery, and a suitable address for effecting her designs, and triumphing over innocence; then, in fine, if religion, virtue, principle, equity, gratitude, and good faith, are not empty sounds, the stage will prove the greatest of nuisances, and deserve to be styled the principal corrupter of the age. Whether such an era bath ever happened in the history of the theatre, in this or any other country, or is likely to happen, I do not take upon me to decide. Another remarkable difference, the only one which remains to be observed, between the vehement or contentious and the derisive, consists in the manner of conducting them. As in each there is a mixture of argument, this in the former ought, in appearance at least, to have the ascendant, but not in the latter. The attack of the declaimer is direct and open ; argument, therefore, is his avowed aim. On the contrary, The passions which he excites ought never to appear to the auditors as the effects of his intention and address, but both in him and them, as the native, the unavoidable consequences of the subject treated, and of that conviction which his reasoning produces in the understanding. Although, in fact, he intends to move his auditory, he only declares his purpose to convince them. To reverse this method, and profess an intention to work upon their passions, would be, in effect, to tell them that he meant to impose upon their understandings, and to bias them by his art, and, consequently, would be to warn them to be on their guard against him. Nothing is better founded than the famous aphorism of rhetoricians, that the perfection of art consists in concealing the art. * On the other hand, the assault of him who ridicules is from its very nature covert and oblique. What we profess to contemn, we scorn to confute. It is on this account that the reasoning in ridicule, if at all delicate, is always conveyed under a species of disguise. Nay, sometimes which is more astonishing, the contempt itself seems to Le dissembled, and the railer assumes an air of arguing gravely in defense of that which he actually exposes as ridiculous. Hence, undoubtedly, it proceeds'that a serious manner commonly adds energy to a joke. The fact, however, is, that in this case the very dissimulation is dissembled. He would not have you think him in earnest, though he affects the appearance of it, Knowing that otherwise his end would be frustrated. He wants that you should perceive that he is dissembling, which no real dissembler ever wanted. It is, indeed, this circumstance alone which distinguishes an ironical expression from a lie. Accordingly, through the thinness of the veil employed, he takes care that the sneer shall be discovered. You are quickly made to petceive his aim by means of the strange arguments he produces, the absurd consequences he draws, the odd embarrassments which in his personated character he is involved in, and the still odder methods he takes to disentangle himself. In this manner doctrines and practices are treated, when exposed by a continued run of irony ; a way of refutation which bears a strong analogy to that species of demonstration termed by mathematicians anagogical, as reducing the adversary to what is contrairetory or impracticable. This method seems to have been first introduced into moral subjects, and employed with success, by the father of ancient wisdom, Socrates. As the attack of ridicule, whatever form it adopts, is always indirect, that of irony may be said to be reverted. It resembles the manner of fighting ascribed to the ancient Parthian, who were ever more formidable in flight than in onset; who looked towards one quarter, and fought towards the opposite ; whose bodies moved in one direction, and their arrows in the contrary. * • It remains now to confirm and illustrate this branch of the theory by suitable examples. And, not to encumber the reader with a needless multiplicity of excerptions, I shall first recur to those already produced. The first, second. and fifth passages from Butler, the first from Pope, the first from Young, and the quotation from the Dispensary, though witty, have no ridicule in them. Their whole aim is to divert by the oddness of the imagery. This merits a careful and particular attention, as on the accuracy of our conceptions here depends, in a great measure, our forming a just notion of the relation which ridicule bears to wit, and of the distinction that subsists between them. Let this, therefore, be carefully remembered, that where nothing reprehensible, or supposed to be reprehensible, either in conduct or in sentiment, is struck at, there is properly no satire (or, as it is sometimes termed emphatically enough, pointed wit), and, consequently, no ridicule. The example that first claims a particular notice here is one from Young's Satires : • "Health chiefly keeps an Atheist in the dark, " &c. • • The witnesses of this passage was already illustrated ; I shall now endeavor to show the argument couched under it, both which together constitute the ridicule. "Atheism is unreasonable. " Why 1 "The Atheist neither founds his unbelief on reason, nor will attend to it. Was ever an infidel in health convinced by reasoning I or did he ever in sickness need to be reasoned with on this subject! The truth, then, is, that the daring principles of the libertine are solely supported by the vigor and healthiness of his constitution, which incline him to pleasure, thoughtlessness, and presumption ; accordingly, you find, that when this foundation is subverted, the whole fabric of infidelity falls to pieces. " There is rarely, however, so much of argument in ridicule as may be discovered in this passage. Generally, as was observed already, it is but hinted in a single word or phrase, or appears to be • • Miles sagittas et celerem fugam Parthi--perhorrescit. —Hoit. • • Fidentemque foga Parthum versisque sagatts. — oVias • • glanced at occasionally, without any direct intention. Thus, in the third quotation from Butler, there is an oblique thrust at Homer for his manner of recurring so often, in poems of so great dignity, to such wean and trifling epithets. The fourth and the sixth satirize the particular fanatical practice, and fanatical opinion, to which they refer. To assign a preposterous motive to an action, or to produce an absurd argument for an opinion, is an innuendo that no good motive or argument can be given. * The citations from the Rape of the Lock are no otherwise to be considered as ridicule, than as a lively exhibition of some follies, either in disposition or in behavior, is the strongest dissuasive from imitating them. In this way [[humor] rarely fails to have some raillery in it, in like manner as the pathetic often persuades without argument, which, when obvious, is supplied by the judgment of the hearer The second example seems intended to disgrace the petty quaintness of a fop's manner, and the emptiness of his conversation, as being a huddle of oaths and nonsense. The third finely satirizes the value which the ladies too often put upon the merest trifles. To these I shall add one instance more from Hudibras, where it is said of priests and exorcists, • • "Supplied with spiritual provision, And magazines of ammunition, With crosses, relics, crucifixes, Beads, pictures, rosaries, and pixes, The tools of working out salvation, By mere mechanic operation. "$ • The reasoning here is sufficiently insinuated by the happy application of a few words, such as mechanic tools to the work of salvation ; crosses, relics, beads, pictures, and other such trumpery, to spiritual provision. The justness of the representation of their practice, together with the manifest incongruity nrthe things, supply us at once with the wit and the argument. There is in this poem a great deal ofeidicute ; but the author's quarry is the frantic excesses of enthusiasm and the base artifices of hypocrisy ; he very rarely, as in the above passage, points to the idiot gewgaws of superstition. I shall only add one instance from Pope, which has something peculiar in it : • "Then sighing thus, And am I now threescore • • Ah ! why, ye gods ! should two and two make four?' "§ • A. We have an excellent specimen of this sort of ridicule in Montesquietes Spirit of Laws, b. xv. , c. v. , where the practice of Europeans in enslaving the negroes is ironically justified, in a manner which does honor to the author's humanity and love of justice, at the same time that it display a happy talent in ridicule. t Ridicule, resulting from a simple but humorous narration, is finely illustrated in the first ten or twelve Provincial Letters. • t Part iii. , canto I. § Duncind. • • This, though not in the narrative, but in the dramatic style, is more witty than humorous. The absurdity of the exclamation in the second line is too gross to be natural to any but a madman, and, therefore, hath not humor. Nevertheless, its resemblance to the common complaint of old age, con tamed in the first, of which it may be called the analysis, TV1. ders it at once both an ingenious exhibition of such complaint in its real import, and an argument of its folly. But, notwithstanding this example, it holds in general, that when anything nonsensical in principle is to be assailed by ridicule, the natural ally of reason is wit ; when any extravagance or impropriety in conduct, humor seldom fails to be of the confederacy. It may be farther observed, that thp words banterand raillery are also used to signify ridicule of a certain form, applied, indeed, more commonly to practices than to opinions, and oftener to the little peculiarities of individuals than to the distinguishing customs or usages of sects and parties. The only difference in meaning, as far as I have remarked, be- _ tween the two terms, is, that the first generally denotes a coarser, the second a finer sort of ridicule ; the former pre-. veils most among the lower classes of the people, the latter only among persons of breeding. • I shall conclude this chapter with observing, that though the gayer and more familiar eloquence, now explained, may often properly, as was remarked before, be admitted into public orations on subjects of consequence, such, for instance as are delivered in the senate or at the bar, and even sometimes, though more sparingly, on the bench, it is seldom or never of service in those which come from the pulpit. It is - true that an air of ridicule in disproving or dissuading, by reit dering opinions or practices contemptible, hath occasionally been attempted, with approbation, by preachers of great name. I can only say, that when this airy manner is employed, it requires to be managed with the greatest care and delicacy, that it may not degenerate into a strain but ill adapted to so serioia an occupation : for the reverence of the place, the gravity of the function, the solemnity of worship, the severity of the precepts, and the importance of the motives of religion; above all, the awful presence of God, with a sense of which the mind, when occupied in religious exercises, ought eminently to be impressed—all these seem utterly incompatible with the levity of ridicule. They render jesting impertinence, and laughter madness. Therefore, anything in preaching which might provoke this emotion, would justly be deemed an unpardonable offence against both piety and decorum. In the two preceding chapters I have considered the nature of oratory in general, its various forms, whether arising from difference in the object, understanding, imagination, passion, will ; or in the subject, eminent and severe, light and frivo • Ions, with their respectiCe ends and characters. Under these are included all the primary and characteristical qualities of whatever can pertinently find a place either in writing or in discourse, or can truly be termed fine in the one, or eloquent in the other. • • CHAPTER 111. THE DOCTRINE OF THE esteeming CHAPTER SJLIFENDED. • BEFORE I proceed to another topic, it will perhaps be thought proper to inquire how far the theory now laid down and explained coincides with the doctrines on this article to be found in the writings of philosophers and critics. Not that I think such inquiries and discussions always necessary ; on the contrary, I imagine they often tend but to embarrass the reader, by distracting his attention to a multiplicity of objects, and so to darken and perplex a plain question. This is particularly the case on those points on which there hath been a variety of jarring sentiments. The simplest way and the most perspicuous, and generally that which best promotes the discovery of truth, is to give as distinct and methodical a delineation as possible of one's own ideas, together with the grounds on which they are founded, and to leave it to the doubtful reader (who thinks it worth the trouble) to compare the theory with the systems of other writers, and then to judge for himself. I am not, however, so tenacious of this method as not to allow that it may sometimes, with advantage, be departed from. This holds especially when the sentiments of , an author are opposed by inveterate prejudices in the reader, arising from contrary opinions early imbibed, or from an excessive deference to venerable names and ancient authorities. • SECTION!. ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNT OF The Ridiculous EXPLAINED • Song, on a superficial view, may imagine that the doctrine above expounded is opposed by no less authority than that of Aristotle. If it were, I should not think that equivalent to a demonstration of its falsity. But let us hear : Aristotle hath observed, that "the ridiculous implies something deformed, and consists in those smaller faults which are neither painful nor pernicious, but unbeseeming : thus, a face excites laughter wherein there is deformity and distortion without pain. " For my part, nothing can appear more coincident than this, as far as it goes, with the principles which I have endeavored to establish. The Stagyrite here speaks of ridicule, not of laughter in general ; and not of every sort of ridicule, but solely of the ridiculous in manners, of which he hath in few winds given a very apposite Description. To take notice of any other laughable object would have been foreign to his purpose. Laughter is not his theme, but comedy, and laughter only so far as comedy is concerned with it. Now the concern of comedy reaches no farther than that kind of ridicule which, as I said, relates to manners. The very words with which the above quotation is introduced evince the truth of this : "Comedy, " says he, "is, as we remarked, an imitation of things that are amiss ; yet it does not level at every vice. " lie had remarked in the preceding chapter, that its means of correction are "not reproach, but ridicille. "f Nor does the clause in the end of the sentence, concerning a countenance which raises laughter, in the least invalidate what I have now affirmed ; for it is plain that this is suggested in a way of similitude, to illustrate what he had advanced, and not as a particular instance of the position he had laid down. For we can never suppose that he would have called distorted features "a certain fault or slip, "* and still less that he would have specified this, as. what might be corrected by the art of the comedian. As an instance, therefore, it would have confuted his definition, and shown that his account of the object of laughter must be erroneous, since this emotion may be excited, as appears from the example produced by himself, where there is nothing faulty or vicious in any kind or degree. As an illustration it was extremely pertinent. It showed that the ridiculous in manners (which was all that his definition regarded) was, as far as the different nature of the things would permit, analogous to the laughable in other subjects, and that it supposed an incongruous combination, where there is nothing either calamitous or destructive. But that in other objects unconnected with either character or conduct, with either the body or the soul, there might not be images or exhibitions presented to the mind which would naturally provoke laughter, the philosopher hath nowhere, as far as I know, so much as insinuated. • • SECTION II. HOBBES'S ACCOUNT OF Laughter EXAMINED. • FROM the founder of the peripatetic school, let us descend . to the philosopher of Malmesbury, who hath defined laughter "a sudden glory, arising from a sudden conception of • • some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly. "4" This account is, I acknowledge, incompatible with that given in the preceding pages, and, in my judgment, results entirely from a view of the subject which is in some respect partial, and in some respect false. It is in some respect partial. When laughter gs produced by ridicule, it is, doubtless, accompanied with some degree of contemn'. Ridicule as bath been observed already, has a double operation: fir on the fancy, by presenting to it such a group as constit, es a laughable object ; secondly, an the passion mentioned, by exhibiting absurdity in human character, in irinciples, or in conduct : and contempt always implies a sense of superiority. No wonder, then, that one likes not to be ridiculed or laughed at. Now it is this union which is the great source of this author's error, and of his attributing to one of the associated principles, from an imperfect view of the subject, what is purely the effect of the other. • For, that the emotion called laughter doth not result from the contempt, but solely from the perception of oddity with which the passion is occasionally, not necessarily, combined, is manifest from the 'following considerations. First, con- . tempt may be raised in a very high degree, both suddenly and unexpectedly, without producing the least tendency to laugh. • Of this instances have been given already from Bolingbroke and Swift, and innumerable others will occur to those who are conversant in the writings of those authors. Secondly, laughter may be, and is daily produced by the perception of incongruous association, when there is no contempt. And this shows that Hobbes's view of the matter is false as well as partial. "Men, " says he, "laugh at jests, the where of always consisteth in the elegant discovering an conveying to our minds some absurdity of another. l. I maintain that men also laugh at jests, the wit whereof doth not consist in discovering any absurdity of another ; for all jests do not come within his Description. On a careful perusal of the foregoing sheets, the reader will find that there have been several instances of this kind produced already, in which it hath been observed that there is wit, but no ridicule. I shall bring but one other instance. Many have laughed at the queerness of the comparison in these lines, • "For rhyme the x udder is of verses With which, like ships, they steel; their coup:wen who never dreamed that there was any person or party, practice or opinion, derided in them. But as people are often very ingenious in their manner of defending a favorite hypothesis, if any admirer of the Hobbesian philosophy should pretend to discover some class of men whom the poet here meant to ridicule, he ought to consider, that if anyone hath been tickled with the passage to whom the same thought never occurred, that single instance would be sufficient to subvert the doctrine, as it would show that there may be laughter where there is no triumph or glorying over anybody%and, consequently, no conceit of one's own superiority. So that there may be, . and often is, both contempt without laughter, and laughter without contempt. Besides, where wit is really pointed, which constitutes ridicule, that it is not from what gives the conceit of our own eminence by comparison, but purely from the odd assemblage of ideas, that the laughter springs, is evident from this, that if you make but a trifling alteration on the expression, so as to destroy the wit (which often turns on a very little circumstance), without altering the real import of the sentence (a thing not only possible, but easy), you will produce the same opinion and the same contempt, and, consequently, will give the same subject of triumph, yet without the least tendency to laugh ; and conversely, in reading a well-written satire, a nian may be much diverted by the wit, whose judgment is not convinced by the ridicule or insinuated argument, and whose , former esteem of the object is not in the least impaired. Indeed, men's telling their own blunders, even blunders recently committed, and laughing at them, a thing not uncommon in very risible dispositions, is utterly inexplicable on Hobbes's system : for, to consider the thing only with regard to the laugher himself, there is to him no subject of glorying that is not counterbalanced by an equal subject of humiliation (he being both the person laughing, and the person laughed at) and these two subjects must destroy one another. With regard to others, he appears solely under the notion of inferiority, as the person triumphed over. Indeed, as in ridicule, agreeably to the doctrine here propounded, there is always some degree, often but a very slight degree, of contempt ; it is not every character, I acknowledge, that is fond of presenting to others such subjects of mirth. Wherever one shows a proneness to it, it is demonstrable that on that person sociality and the love of laughter have much greater influence than vanity or self-conceit : since, for the sake of sharing with others in the joyous entertainment, he can submit to the mortifying circumstance of being the subject. This, however, is in effect no more than enjoying the sweet which predominates, notwithstanding a little of the bitter with which it is mingled. The laugh in this case is so far from being expressive of the passion, that it is produced in spite of the passion, which operates against it, and, if strong enough, would effectually restrain it. But it is impossible that there could be any enjoyment to him, on the other hypothesis, which makes the laughter merely the expression of a triumph, occasioned by the sudden display of one's own comparative excellence, a triumph in which the person derided could not 'partake. In this case, on the contrary, he must undoubtedly sustain the part of the weeper (according to the account which the same author hath given of that opposite passion; as he calls it), and "suddenly fall out with himself, on the sudden conception of defect. " To suppose that a person, in laughing, enjoys the contempt of himself as a matter of exultation over his ow n infirmity, is of a piece with Cowley's Description of envy exaggerated to absurdity, wherein she is said "To envy at the praise herself had wott'l In the same way, a miser may be said to grudge the money that himself hath got, or a glutton the repasts: for the lust of praise as much terminates in self as avarice or gluttony. It is a strange sort of theory which makes the frustration of a passion, and the gratification, the same thing. As to the remark that wit is not the only cause of this emotion, that men laugh at indecencies and mischances, nothing is more certain. A well-dressed man falling into the kennel, will raise, in the spectators, a peal of laughter. But this confirms, instead of weakening, the doctrine here laid down. The genuine object is always things grouped together in which there is some striking unsuitableness. The effect is mach the same, whether the things themselves are presented to the senses by external accident, or the ideas of them are presented to the imagination by wit and humor ; though it is only with the latter that the subject of eloquence is concerned. In regard to Hobbes's system, I shall only remark farther, that according to it, a very risible man, and a very self-conceited, supercilious man, should imply the same character, yet, in fact, perhaps no two characters more rarely meet in the same person. Pride, and contempt, its usual attendant, considered in themselves, are unpleasant passions, and tend to make men fastidious, always finding ground to be dissatisfied with their situation and their company. Accordingly, those who are most addicted to these passions, are not, generally, the happiest of mortals. It is only when the last ot these bath gotten for an alloy a considerable share of sensibility in regard to wit and humor, which serves both to moderate and to sweeten the passion, that it can be termed in any degree sociable or agreeable. It hath been often remarked of very proud persons that they disdain to laugh, as thinking that it derogates from their dignity, and levels them f * Hobbes's Hum. Nat, ch. ix. , 14. Davideis, book 1. . too much with the common herd. The merriest people, on the contrary, are the least suspected of being haughty and contemptuous people. The company of the former is generally as much courted as that of the latter is shunned. To refer ourselves to such universal observations is to appeal to the common sense of mankind. How admirably is the height of pride and arrogance touched in the character which Clem gives of Cassius ! "He loves i o plays As thou don’t, Antony; he ban s no music, Seldom he smiles, and smiles in such a sort, As if he mock'd himself; and scom'd his spirit, That could be moved to smile at anything. ' I should not have been so particular in the refutation of the English philosopher's system in regard to laughter, had I not considered a careful discussion of this question as one of the best means of developing some of the radical principles of this inquiry.